Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Jennie Olmsted, Angelica Evans, and George Barros
July 5, 2025, 5:20 pm ET
Click on right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date every day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Click on right here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click on right here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cellular machine) is strongly beneficial for utilizing this data-heavy instrument.
Click on right here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces every day by exhibiting a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.
Notice: The information cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on July 5. ISW will cowl subsequent reviews within the July 6 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.
Russian forces not too long ago superior northeast of Pokrovsk and will try to advance additional towards Dobropillya as a part of a mutually reinforcing effort to envelop Pokrovsk and bypass Ukraine’s fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast from the west within the coming months. Geolocated footage printed on July 4 signifies that Russian forces not too long ago seized Koptieve and Shevchenko Pershe and superior to southeastern Razine (all northeast of Pokrovsk).[1] Russian forces have not too long ago seized on opportunistic advances northeast of Pokrovsk, following their deal with advances alongside the Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka T-0504 freeway since early 2025.[2] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Normal Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on June 28 that Russian forces seem like attacking within the “Dobropillya route” (northwest of Toretsk and Pokrovsk) and that components of the Russian 68th Military Corps (AC) (Japanese Army District [EMD]) and twentieth and a hundred and fiftieth motorized rifle divisions (each of the eighth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) are attacking within the space.[3] ISW beforehand assessed that the Russian army command could intend to leverage the Russian salient between Pokrovsk and Toretsk to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast and north or to bypass Ukrainian defenses in Kostyantynivka from the southwest and west.[4]
The Russian items conducting these assaults have been engaged in fight since they redeployed to strengthen the Russian power grouping working east of Pokrovsk in February and March 2025.[5] Ukrainian army observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 3 that components of the Russian thirty ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC) and a hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division have been working close to Novotoretske (north of Razine) and Novoekonomichne (south of Razine) after seizing Malynivka in mid-June 2025 and not too long ago seizing Koptieve (all northeast of Pokrovsk).[6] Mashovets acknowledged that components of the Russian one hundred and tenth Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, previously 1st Donetsk Folks’s Republic AC, SMD) are additionally working northeast of Pokrovsk.[7] Ukrainian forces have been degrading these Russian items, and it’s unclear whether or not the Russian army command intends to leverage the identical items to push additional north and west of Razine or if Russia could try to strengthen these items with extra redeployments. These Russian items should cross the Kazenyi Torets River to advance west of Razine, which can current one other impediment to the Russian advance relying on the river’s water degree.
Russian advances west and northwest of Razine most instantly assist the envelopment of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad — an operational goal that Russian forces have been pursuing over the past 18 months. ISW forecasted in December 2024 that Russian forces would wish to make important advances within the route of Rodynske (west of Razine) to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast, and the Russian forces’ current advances close to Razine cohere with this evaluation.[8] The commander of a Ukrainian Nationwide Guard artillery reconnaissance battalion working within the Pokrovsk route reported on July 5 that Russian forces are focusing their assaults between Malynivka, Novoolenivka, and Popiv Yar (all northeast of Pokrovsk) in an effort to interdict Ukrainian logistics into Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and Pokrovsk.[9] The Ukrainian commander famous that Russian forces are continuously conducting assaults with bikes and buggies. Russian milbloggers claimed on July 4 and 5 that Russian forces try to complicate Ukrainian logistics within the space by damaging a bridge close to Shakhove (east of Dobropillya), interdicting Ukrainian forces’ floor traces of communication (GLOCs) close to Udachne, and alongside the railway line close to Kotlyne.[10]
Russian forces have largely struggled to advance southeast, south, and southwest of Pokrovsk within the face of Ukrainian drones since late 2024 and have primarily held near the identical positions in these areas since January 2025. The Russian army command could also be prioritizing advances northeast of Pokrovsk in an effort to determine a stronghold in Rodynske, which might allow Russian forces to both assault Pokrovsk immediately or advance towards Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Pokrovsk) with the intention of interdicting the Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad M-30 freeway and forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Pokrovsk beneath the specter of envelopment Russian forces might additionally advance north of Udachne or Kotlyne (each southwest of Pokrovsk) with the intention to interdict the M-30 freeway if they’ll overcome Ukrainian defensive positions within the space, which at the moment appears unsure.
Additional Russian advances towards Dobropillya would point out that Russian forces are inserting a tactical prioritization on advancing west of Ukraine’s fortress belt — a sequence of fortified cities that type the spine of Ukraine’s defensive positions — and forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the fortress belt beneath stress of envelopment quite than conduct a head-on assault towards the fortress belt. Russian forces have to date struggled to interrupt out of Toretsk and make important advances from Chasiv Yar or north of the Kleban Byk Reservoir (northwest of Toretsk), which has seemingly difficult the Russian army command’s authentic plan for an operation towards Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk) and the broader fortress belt. The Russian army command could also be adjusting its plan, and Russian forces could try to create a salient within the fields and small settlements between Dobropillya and Kostyantynivka with the intention to bypass the fortress belt from the west. Russian forces would seemingly need to cross the Kazenyi Torets River in a number of locations and would have to have the ability to sufficiently provide troops on the west (proper) financial institution with the intention to keep such a salient. Russian forces would seemingly additionally need to seize the settlements alongside the Pokrovsk-Oleksandrivka (north of Dobropillya) line with the intention to absolutely interdict Ukrainian floor traces of communication (GLOCs) to the fortress belt. It’s unclear whether or not the Russian Central Grouping of Forces, which is at the moment in control of exercise within the Pokrovsk route, is able to conducting such an operation with the degraded forces at the moment at its disposal. Russian forces are seemingly reaching greater ranges of exhaustion and degradation after properly over a yr of intensified offensive operations within the Pokrovsk route. Such an operation would seemingly be a multi-year effort with important personnel losses and hard-fought positive aspects, though Russian forces have confirmed prepared to undertake such long-term operations.[11]
Such an operation can be in step with Russia’s current ways and operational ideas designed to advance by leveraging smaller partial envelopments to grab territory as a substitute of trying fast, deep operational-level penetrations of Ukraine’s protection, which Russian forces at the moment do not need the means to conduct. ISW beforehand assessed that the Russian army command seems to be growing and disseminating a doctrinal methodology for advances all through the theater that goals to leverage creeping partial envelopments of frontline cities and settlements to power Ukrainian withdrawals, based mostly on Russian forces operational sample demonstrated in its seizures of Avdiivka in February 2024 and Vuhledar in October 2024.[12] Russian forces have demonstrated a capability to plan and execute restricted campaigns in a chosen space of operations to exert and maintain most stress and to mitigate the danger of overextending their forces whereas forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw beneath risk of tactical encirclement. The Russian army command is probably going implementing the identical doctrinal methodology used to grab Avdiivka and Vuhledar in its makes an attempt to grab Pokrovsk and probably Ukraine’s fortress belt.
Ukrainian forces proceed to reveal their capacity to conduct long-range strikes that focus on Russia’s protection industrial base (DIB). The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported on July 5 that Ukrainian Forces, together with components of the Unmanned Programs Forces, performed a strike towards the Russian Joint Inventory Firm VNIIR-Progress Plant in Cheboksary, Chuvashia Republic, on the evening of July 4 to five.[13] The Ukrainian Normal Employees acknowledged that the plant produces the “Kometa” adaptive antenna arrays, that are utilized in Shahed drones, Iskander-Okay cruise missiles, KAB guided bombs, and different high-precision weapons. Geolocated footage printed on July 4 exhibits {that a} Ukrainian drone struck the VNIIR-Progress Plant.[14] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on July 5 that the Ukrainian drone strike induced a fireplace on the plant.[15] The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported that Ukrainian Forces, together with components of the Unmanned Programs Forces, additionally performed a strike towards the Borisoglebsk Airfield, Voronezh Oblast, and struck a KAB guided glide bomb warehouse and fight coaching plane.[16] The Ukrainian Normal Employees acknowledged that Russian forces base Su-34 fighter-bombers, Su-35M fighter jets, and Su-30SM fighter jets on the Brisoglebsk Airfield. NASA Fireplace Info for Useful resource Administration (FIRMS) information for July 5 exhibits satellite-detected warmth anomalies at Borisoglebsk Airfield, together with within the central a part of the airport and the logistical part.[17]
Ukraine’s Western companions proceed to allocate assist to Ukraine and collaborate with the Ukrainian protection industrial base (DIB). Ukraine’s Ministry of Financial system introduced on July 4 that Ukraine and South Korea launched a brand new Financial Innovation Partnership Program (EIPP) during which South Korea will allocate $10 million for the implementation of infrastructure initiatives in Ukraine over the following 4 years.[18] Ukraine’s Ministry of Financial system reported that the initiative contains provisions for strategic consultations, improvement initiatives, and feasibility research aimed toward long-term financial cooperation between Ukraine and South Korea in the private and non-private sectors. Ukraine’s Minister of Strategic Business Herman Smetanin introduced on July 4 that Ukraine signed an settlement with Denmark that may enable Ukrainian protection industrial corporations to export manufacturing to Denmark, rising the dimensions and provide of Ukrainian weapons in a location the place Russian forces are unable to strike Ukrainian protection industrial amenities.[19] The Danish Ministry of Protection (MoD) equally introduced on June 29 that Denmark is allocating 67 million euros (roughly $79 million) to speed up the institution of Ukrainian protection industrial corporations in Denmark.[20]
European intelligence companies proceed to report that Russia is intensifying its deployment of chemical brokers in Ukraine in violation of the Chemical Weapons Conference (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory. Dutch Protection Minister Ruben Brekelmans reported on July 4 that Dutch and German intelligence companies have proof that Russian forces are incessantly using banned chemical brokers in Ukraine.[21] Brekelmans acknowledged that Russian forces are intensifying their use of chemical brokers, together with utilizing drones to drop choking brokers into Ukrainian trenches to power Ukrainian troopers into the road of fireside. The Dutch and German intelligence companies reported that Russian forces are normalizing and standardizing using chemical brokers, akin to tear fuel and chloropicrin, alongside the frontline and that Russia is investing in chemical weapons analysis.[22]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces not too long ago superior northeast of Pokrovsk and will try to advance additional towards Dobropillya as a part of a mutually reinforcing effort to envelop Pokrovsk and bypass Ukraine’s fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast from the west within the coming months.
- Russian advances west and northwest of Razine most instantly assist the envelopment of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad — an operational goal that Russian forces have been pursuing over the past 18 months.
- Additional Russian advances towards Dobropillya would point out that Russian forces are inserting a tactical prioritization on advancing west of Ukraine’s fortress belt – a sequence of fortified cities that type the spine of Ukraine’s defensive positions – and forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the fortress belt beneath stress of envelopment quite than conduct a head-on assault towards the fortress belt.
- Such an operation can be in step with Russia’s current ways and operational ideas designed to advance by leveraging smaller partial envelopments to grab territory as a substitute of trying fast, deep operational-level penetrations of Ukraine’s protection, which Russian forces at the moment do not need the means to conduct.
- Ukrainian forces proceed to reveal their capacity to conduct long-range strikes that focus on Russia’s protection industrial base (DIB).
- Ukraine’s Western companions to proceed to allocate assist to Ukraine and collaborate with the Ukrainian protection industrial base (DIB).
- European intelligence companies proceed to report that Russia is intensifying its deployment of chemical brokers in Ukraine in violation of the Chemical Weapons Conference (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory.
- Ukrainian forces not too long ago superior close to Siversk. Russian forces not too long ago superior close to Kupyansk, Siversk, and Pokrovsk.
We don’t report intimately on Russian battle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t immediately have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We’ll proceed to guage and report on the consequences of those felony actions on the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity despite the fact that we don’t describe them in these reviews.
- Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Major Effort – Japanese Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate principal efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis
- Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
- Important Exercise in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Preventing continued in Kursk Oblast on July 5.
Russian forces continued assaults in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 4 and 5.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked close to Bezsalivka (southwest of Glushkovo alongside the worldwide border in northern Sumy Oblast) and Novyi Put (southwest of Glushkovo).[24]
Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly working within the Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) route.[25]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine alongside the worldwide border and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Sumy Metropolis)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 5 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked within the Sumy Oblast border space on July 4 and 5.[26]
The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian amenities in Konotop (northwest of Sumy Metropolis) with a Geran-2 (Shahed-variant) drone.[27]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian eleventh and 83rd airborne (VDV) brigades reportedly proceed to function within the Sumy route.[28]
Russian Major Effort – Japanese Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kharkiv route on July 5 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Hlyboke, Zelene, and Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis close to Vovchansk on July 4 and 5.[29]
Order of Battle: Components of the Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz “Bati” Detachment (204th “Akhmat” Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions within the Kharkiv route.[30] Components of the Russian 380th Motorized Rifle Regiment (probably a reconstituted Soviet unit) are reportedly placing Ukrainian positions within the Lyptsi route (north of Kharkiv Metropolis).[31]
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces not too long ago superior within the Kupyansk route.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on July 5 signifies that Russian forces superior marginally in southwestern Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk).[32]
Unconfirmed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 4 and 5 that Russian forces superior southwest of Milove (north of Kupyansk alongside the worldwide border) and west of Topoli (northeast of Kupyansk).[33]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk close to Kamyanka, north of Kupyansk close to Holubivka and Radkivka, and towards Kutkivka and Kolodyazne, and alongside the worldwide border close to Milove and Chuhunivka on July 4 and 5.[34]
A supply reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian army intelligence reported on July 4 that Russian forces seized Milove and the encompassing forest areas and are seemingly getting ready to assault Bolohivka or Odradne (southeast of Milove) within the close to future to assist their efforts to create a bridgehead on the west (proper) financial institution of the Oskil River.[35] The supply acknowledged that Russian forces haven’t launched a large-scale offensive operation close to Milove and try to assault towards Zarubnka (west of Milove) and Ambarne (south of Milove).
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova route on July 5 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 5 that Russian forces superior northeast of Nova Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova).[36]
Russian forces attacked north of Borova close to Zahryzove, east of Borova close to Nadiya and Zelenyi Hai, and southeast of Borova close to Hrekivka and Novoyehorivka on July 4 and 5.[37]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Lyman route on July 5 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Lyman towards Shandryholove; north of Lyman close to Karpivka, Ridkodub, Zelena Dolyna, Novyi Myr, and Kolodyazi; northeast of Lyman close to Torske and Myrne; east of Lyman close to Dibrova; and southeast of Lyman within the Serebryanske forest space on July 4 and 5.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 4 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Ridkodub.[39]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Lyman route reported on July 5 that Russian forces are transferring unspecified items from different instructions to the Lyman route.[40] The spokesperson acknowledged that Russian forces have roughly two divisions’ price of troopers working within the Lyman route and that Russian forces not too long ago tried a mechanized assault on this route.
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and probably advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Ukrainian and Russian forces not too long ago superior within the Siversk route.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage printed on July 2 signifies that Ukrainian forces not too long ago marginally superior within the Serebryanske forest space northeast of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[41]
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on July 4 signifies that Russian forces superior south of Hryhorivka throughout a platoon-sized mechanized assault.[42]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior into jap Siversk.[43]
Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Siversk close to Hryhorivka, east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk close to Ivano-Dariivka and Vyimka on July 4 and 5.[44]
Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (third Mixed Arms Military [CAA], previously 2nd Luhansk Folks’s Republic [LNR] Military Corps [AC], Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly working within the Siversk route.[45]
Russian forces continued assaults within the Chasiv Yar route on July 5 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces continued assaults south of Chasiv Yar close to Bila Hora on July 5.[46]
One Russian milblogger questioned current claims that Russian forces seized Predtechyne (south of Chasiv Yar).[47]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly working in Chasiv Yar.[48]
Russian forces continued assaults within the Toretsk route on July 5 however didn’t advance.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior in central and southeastern Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[49]
Russian forces continued assaults close to Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk close to Dyliivka and towards Pleshchiivka; west of Toretsk close to Katerynivka and the Kleban-Byk Reservoir; southwest of Toretsk close to Romanivka; and northwest of Toretsk close to Rusyn Yar, Poltavka, and Yablunivka on July 4 and 5.[50]
Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (twentieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth CAA, SMD) are reportedly working close to Yablunivka.[51]
The Ukrainian Normal Employees reported on July 4 that Ukrainian forces efficiently struck a command submit of the Russian eighth CAA and one other command submit of the twentieth Motorized Rifle Division in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[52]
Russian forces not too long ago superior within the Pokrovsk route.
Assessed Russian advances: See topline textual content for reviews of Russian advances within the Pokrovsk route.
Russian forces continued assaults close to Pokrovsk; northeast of Pokrovsk close to Malynivka, Myrolyubivka, Novoekonomichne, Novotoretske, Razine, and Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk close to Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk close to Shevchenko, Novoukrainka, and Zvirove; southwest of Pokrovsk close to Udachne; and west of Pokrovsk towards Serhiivka on July 4 and 5.[53]
Order of Battle: Components of the “Maksim Krivonos” Detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly working within the Pokrovsk route.[54]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Novopavlivka route on July 5 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior south of Piddubne, seized most of Tovste (previously Tolstoi), and superior east of Novokhatske (all southwest of Novopavlivka).[55]
Russian forces continued assaults close to Novopavlivka; northeast of Novopavlivka close to Novoserhiivka and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka close to Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka close to Oleksiivka; and south of Novopavlivka close to Zaporizhzhia, Komar, and Myrne; and southwest of Novopavlivka close to Zirka and Tovste on July 4 and 5.[56]
Order of Battle: Components of the Russian thirty sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade (twenty ninth CAA, Japanese Army District [EMD]) are reportedly working close to Piddubne (south of Novopavlivka).[57] Drone operators of the Russian “Rubikon” Middle for Superior Unmanned Applied sciences are reportedly working close to Tovste.[58]
Russian forces continued assaults within the Velyka Novosilka route on July 5 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that extra components of the Russian thirty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty sixth CAA, EMD) superior southeast of and into Voskresenka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[59]
Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Shevchenko and towards Voskresenka and southwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Novopil on July 4 and 5.[60]
A servicemember in a Ukrainian brigade working within the Velyka Novosilka route reported that Russian forces are utilizing yellow or blue tape to disguise themselves from Ukrainian forces.[61] ISW beforehand famous that these deception ways could quantity to acts of perfidy — a battle crime beneath the Geneva Conference.[62]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Keep frontline positions, safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia Metropolis)
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Hulyaipole route on July 5 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole close to Malynivka on July 5.[63]
Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (fifth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Japanese Army District [EMD]) are reportedly working close to Malynivka.[64]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 5 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior in northwestern Kamyanske and northeast of Stepove (each southwest of Orikhiv) and in southwestern Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[65]
Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv close to Kamyanske, Shcherbaky, and Mali Shcherbaky and towards Novoandriivka on July 4 and 5.[66]
A supply reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian army intelligence acknowledged that Russian forces have been accumulating manpower and intensifying drone operations round Kamyanske in current weeks.[67] Ukrainian Southern Protection Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported that Russian forces have been unable to achieve a foothold on the precise financial institution of the Yancherkrak River alongside the floodplains however famous that Russian forces might extra simply advance towards Zaporizhzhia Metropolis in the event that they seize Kamyanske.[68] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Orikhiv route reported that Russian forces are replenishing their items within the space as much as 90 % and are intensifying their assaults.[69] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces have shifted their ways within the Orikhiv route and are attacking in blended groups of two well-armed and skilled troopers to clear positions after which comply with up with less-trained squaddies to consolidate positions.
Russian forces continued restricted assaults within the Kherson route, together with close to the Antonivsky Bridge, on July 5, however didn’t advance.[70]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Kherson route reported that Russian forces are intensifying their use of small boats within the space, however that Ukrainian forces are repelling Russian touchdown makes an attempt.[71]
Order of Battle: Components of the Russian 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty ninth CAA, Southern Army District [SMD]) are reportedly working in Kherson Oblast.[72]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces performed a sequence of drone strikes towards Ukraine on the evening of July 4 and 5. The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Russian forces launched 322 Shahed and decoy drones from the instructions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[73] The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 157 drones and that 135 have been ”misplaced” or suppressed by Ukrainian digital warfare (EW) methods. The Ukrainian Air Pressure reported that Russian drones primarily focused Starokostyantyniv, Khmelnytskyi Oblast. Ukrainian officers reported that Russian drones struck residential, civilian, and vitality infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts.[74]
Ukraine’s Safety Service (SBU) reported on July 4 that Russia is utilizing Chinese language-made mounts in recently-launched Russian Shahed-type drones to assist catapult launches.[75] Ukrainian military-focused outlet Militarnyi reported that Russian forces use catapults to deploy giant numbers of drones extra effectively.[76] The Folks’s Republic of China’s (PRC) willingness to fabricate and promote drone parts to the Russian army signifies deeper army cooperation amid the PRC’s more and more evident position in Russia’s battle in Ukraine.
Important exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing important to report.
Notice: ISW doesn’t obtain any categorised materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly accessible data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially accessible satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the idea for these reviews. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.
[1] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9524; https://www.fb.com/watch/?v=1032664728983257 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9522; https://t.me/skala425/622
[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825
[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2025
[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2025
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-21-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-18-2025
[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2025
[7] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2842
[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2024
[9] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1059421-armia-rf-rozvivae-placdarm-v-trikutniku-naselenih-punktiv-malinivka-novoolenivka-popiv-ar-komandir-divizionu/
[10] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171423 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30813
[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-16-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013125
[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar013125
[13] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26299
[14] https://x.com/99Dominik_/standing/1941374542091518102; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/standing/1941406738156294166
[15] https://t.me/astrapress/85667 ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/information/strike-drones-hit-vniir-progress-production-workshop-in-cheboksary/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/85670
[16] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26273 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/05/syly-oborony-vdaryly-po-aerodromu-z-rosijskymy-sushkamy/
[17] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/standing/1941401119781196181; https://x.com/666_mancer/standing/1941365634153189850 ; https://t.co/i4S6uT90cJ
[18] https://suspilne dot media/1058965-pivdenna-korea-ta-ukraina-zapocatkuvali-novu-programu-ekonomicnogo-partnerstva-pogodzeno-persij-trans-u-10-mln/ ; https://me.gov dot ua/Information/Element/c0428306-2b5a-4946-afdc-3c9ed4e2d8cb?lang=uk-UA&title=RespublikaKoreiaZapochatkovuNovuProgramuEkonomichnogoInnovatsiinogoPartnerstvaZUkrainoiuNa10-MlnDol
[19] https://t.me/herman_smetanin_msp/688; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/04/ukrayinski-oboronni-kompaniyi-vidkryyut-vyrobnycztva-v-daniyi/ ; https://suspilne dot media/1058617-ukraina-vidkrie-virobnictvo-zbroi-v-danii/
[20] https://www.fmn.dk/en/information/2025/new-agreement-opens-the-door-for-ukrainian-defence-companies-to-produce-in-denmark/
[21] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-use-chemical-weapons-against-ukraine-widespread-dutch-defence-minister-2025-07-04/
[22] https://english.defensie.nl/newest/information/2025/07/04/russia-further-intensifies-its-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-ukraine
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl
[24] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30836 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74717
[25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30822
[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl
[27] https://t.me/tass_agency/323951 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54395
[28] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30822
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13196
[30] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5820
[31] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171391
[32] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29443; https://t.me/Ochi151/110
[33] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95153; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95128
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13196 ; https://t.me/rybar/71921 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13544
[35] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22116
[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30832
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13196
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13196
[39] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30807
[40] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/05/zi-svoyih-mertvyh-znimaly-shtany-lutaly-yih-konkretno-pro-povagu-u-rosijskomu-vijsku/
[41] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/standing/1941524843859718564; https://t.me/specnazahmat/1452
[42] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9523; https://x.com/richardzai38580/standing/1941197789587009847; https://t.me/osirskiy/1206
[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38170 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30838
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13196
[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/54387
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298
[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/27697 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2025
[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30822
[49] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30831
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13196 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30831
[51] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14000
[52] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vhwAHJqg2Ce2ERxwE7FjEpDKzRsiNAceiuQpdKByTc9wreo9pJ83SnbuYwegd76Ul
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13196
[54] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171373
[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30823 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74717
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13196
[57] https://t.me/voin_dv/15826
[58] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171408
[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30830 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15826 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15839
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13196
[61] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/05/nadyagayut-antydronovi-plashhi-ta-sidayut-na-motoczykly-vijskovi-pro-dyvnu-taktyku-rosiyan/ ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1059177-do-dnipropetrovskoi-oblasti-vijska-rf-ne-dijsli-situacia-u-zoni-vidpovidalnosti-31-ombr-na-novopavlivskomu-napramku/
[62] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925 ; https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-37
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298
[64] https://t.me/voin_dv/15834
[65] https://t.me/dva_majors/74717; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95134
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95134 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74717 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27697
[67] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1058945-rosijski-vijska-prosunulis-v-kamanskomu-na-zaporizzi-mikula/
[68] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1058945-rosijski-vijska-prosunulis-v-kamanskomu-na-zaporizzi-mikula/
[69] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/05/vidpravlyayut-pid-nis-zsu-yakshho-prosyat-rotacziyu-osoblyvyj-pidhid-armiyi-rf-do-svoyih-soldativ/
[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl
[71] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fRTENAVO8mo ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/05/forsuyut-terytoriyu-na-malyh-chovnah-rosiyany-aktyvizuvalysya-na-prydniprovskomu-napryamku/
[72] https://t.me/mod_russia/54392
[73] https://t.me/kpszsu/37750
[74] https://t.me/khmelnytskaODA/5654 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15489 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/05/okupanty-vdaryly-po-chuguyevu-shahedom-postrazhdala-dytyna/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/15490 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/05/harkivshhyna-palaye-12-aviaraket-i-ponad-30-droniv-atakuvaly-oblast/ ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22709 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/04/u-kryvomu-rozi-8-postrazhdalyh-poshkodzheno-bagatopoverhivky-gotel-i-navchalnyj-zaklad/ ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22706 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/04/vorog-znovu-vdaryv-po-kryvomu-rogu-ye-postrazhdali-j-poshkodzhena-infrastruktura/
[75] https://www.fb.com/SecurSerUkraine/posts/pfbid02JH3fAHyxrd8CDZ7mXBsDucnRRKJgw95nhRhuLcni8dubotrgyimEu4yQnBYTKeuol?__cft__[0]=AZWGUUeYU6fmMjDqbw9hdhu6wBQH2raqBCibOWjtTg9z63R7th3tOUJVLIWuFZCAe9ijx6EdjOee3oYby6niKprfh-N3zuZLHEe6TZB89UIAQvWa4lEtlfObYjhZtMNd6zrPTa14cCAGNkb2JpqC-kXf8_a1w0y64ruFyudlg7s9ag&__tn__=%2COpercent2CP-R
[76] https://militarnyi dot com/en/information/russia-launches-shaheds-using-chinese-made-catapult-mounts/
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